Michigan Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 6

1966

The Relative Priority of Small Business Administration Liens: An
Unreasonable Extension of Federal Preference?
Ronald L. Olson
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, and the Supreme Court
of the United States Commons

Recommended Citation
Ronald L. Olson, The Relative Priority of Small Business Administration Liens: An Unreasonable Extension
of Federal Preference?, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1966).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss6/9

This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

The Relative Priority of Small Business Administration
Liens: An Unreasonable Extension of
Federal Preference?
During the past three decades, the priority of the federal government as against state and private creditors competing for the assets
of debtors has been greatly strengthened. 1 In terms of relative growth,
the expansion of federal priority has been comparable to the increased commercial involvement of the United States. In more recent
years, Congress and the judiciary have recognized that this increased
governmental commercial activity necessitates a restriction in sovereign prerogatives.2 However, contrary to this general trend toward
the contraction of sovereign prerogatives and for reasons appearing
unsatisfactory to most commentators,3 the "sovereign prerogative" 4
of priority to the assets of a debtor has been expanded rather than
limited. One agency in particular, the Small Business Administration, has increasingly utilized this prerogative in order to collect its
loans when faced with the claims of competing creditors. It is the
thesis of this comment that the priority which has been judicially accorded the SBA is now extended beyond reasonable bounds and
should be severely restricted.

I.

BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL PRIORITY

The expansion of federal priority can be attributed to two basic
doctrines, one based upon statute5 and the other a creation of the
1. See, e.g., :Bernhardt, Government Priority for Repayment of Monies Advanced
to Contractors, 20 REF. J. 35 (1946); Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The
Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IowA L. R.Ev.
'124 (1965); Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954); Plumb, Federal
Tax Collection and Lien Problems (pts. 1-2), 13 TAX L. R.Ev. 247, 459 (1958).
2. For a judicial limitation of a sovereign prerogative, see Victory Transp. Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). See
generally Note, 63 MICH. L. R.Ev. 708 (1965). Among the many legislative restrictions
are the Court of Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1964); Suit in Admiralty Act § 2, 41 Stat. 525 (1920), as amended, 46
U.S.C. § 742 (1964). See generally Reeves, Good Fences and Good Neighbors: Restraints
on Immunity of Sovereigns, 44 A.B.A.J. 521 (1958).
3. See, e.g., Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign of the
Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IOWA L. REv. 724 (1965); Reeve, The
Relative Priority of Government an.d Private Liens, 29 RoCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 167 (1957);
Note, 63 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 1259 (1963). But see Note, 108 u. PA. L. R.Ev. 909 (1960).
4. "The right of priority of payment of debts due to the government, is a prerogative of the crown well known to the common law." United States v. State :Bank,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 34 (1832). The United States has accorded federal priority by statute,
see R.Ev. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964), and this statutory priority oi the
United States now appears to exceed the crown prerogative recognized in England. See
Salter, Priority Accorded the Sovereign in Bankruptcy: The American and British Views,
63 COM, L.J. 354 (1958).
5. R.Ev. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964) [hereinafter cited as R.S. § 3466]
reads in full:
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jucliciary.6 Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes of 1875, which has
been the principal weapon of the federal government, grants a
"priority" 7 for all United States claims against the estate of a decedent
whose debts exceed his assets, and against insolvent living persons
whose insolvency is manifested by voluntary assignment, the commi~
sion of an act of bankruptcy, or attachment by a creditor of the estate
of an absent debtor. 8 The judiciary has broadened the scope and impact of this statute to allow its use by most federal agencies, 0 to make
it applicable even though the United States was not the debtor of
record when the bankruptcy petition was filed, 10 and to make it applicable to property previously encumbered.11
The other primary weapon of the government, the judicial doctrine of the inchoate lien, has developed generally as a doctrine supplementing two federal statutes-the general priority statute discussed above and the tax lien statute of the Internal Revenue Code.12
Essentially, this doctrine strengthens the federal government's rights
under these statutes by providing that any lien of a competing crediWhenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators,
is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the
United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as
well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his
debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects
of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as
to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed,
See generally Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pemidous Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 908-19 (1954).
6. The doctrine of the inchoate and general lien was originated by the United
States Supreme Court in Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929); Sec
generally Kennedy, supra note 3; Kennedy, supra note 5; Note, 63 CoLuM. L, R.Ev.
1259 (1963).
7. It bas often been stated that R.S. § 3466 creates no lien. See, e.g., United States
v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253, 259 (1923); United States v. Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc.,
219 F. Supp. 448, 451 (W.D. Tex. 1963). See also cases cited in Kennedy, supra note 5,
at 911 n.37. However, Supreme Court decisions since 1929 have rendered these state•
ments virtually meaningless. See authorities cited note 6 supra.
8. See generally Blair, The Priority of the United States in Equity Receiverships,
39 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1 (1925).
9. See, e.g., SBA v, McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960); United States v. Remund, 330
U.S. 539 (1947) (Farm Credit Administration); Luther v. United States, 225 F.2d 495
(10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956) (Commodity Credit Corporation),
But cf. Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. U.S. Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 570 (1922) (federally
owned private corporation cannot claim priority in bankruptcy).
10. W. T. Jones &: Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963); 3
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 11 64.501 (14th ed. 1964).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 861 (1958); Spokane
County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929); W. T. Jones 8: Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc.,
supra note 10.
12, INT, R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6321:
If any person· liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount (including any interest, additional amount, addition to such
tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs that may accrue in addition
thereto) shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights
to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person,
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tor must be specific and perfected before it will be recognized in a
contest against the government. Therefore, the government takes
priority over any competing creditor who does not have a "choate"13
lien against the debtor's property.14 A recent Supreme Court clarification of the inchoate lien doctrine declared that the tests for a "specific
. and perfected lien" differ according to whether the United States
claim is premised on the general priority statute or the tax lien
statute.15 Although the primary impetus for this doctrine and the
priority statutes has been to secure adequate public revenue, 16 the
Court promulgated the less stringent requirements for a lien competing against the federal tax lien. 17 The somewhat questionable result
is that, although taxes are its primary source of revenue, the Government's tax lien is theoretically less effective than the other types of
liens it may assert.
The SBA, which makes extensive use of both the inchoate lien
doctrine and R.S. §. 3466, was created in 195318 to foster the actual
and potential capacity of "small business" 19 through a number of
varied programs20 designed to provide financial assistance, general
13. "Choate" has been equated with "specific and perfected" and is generally understood to mean "complete." In Letter From Alfred F. Conard to Editor, 42 A.B.A.J.
608 (1956), the word is termed "a flag of the new freedom from etymology."
14. This rule is somewhat modified for distributions under the Bankruptcy Act,
where § 64(a) controls. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bonding &: Ins. Co. v. New York, 259
F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1955). However,
§ 64(a)(5) incorporates R.S. § 3466 by indirect reference. See authorities cited note
26 infra. See generally Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of the United States in
Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 HARv. L. REv. 251 (1929).
15. United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351, 358 (1964).
16. See SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 451-52 (1960); Price v. United States, 269
U.S. 492 (1926).
17. For a lien to be specific and perfected when competing against a tax lien, it
must clearly identify the lienor, the property subject to the lien, and the amount of
the lien. In addition to these three qualifications, a lien competing against R.S.
§ 3466 priority is not considered specific and perfected unless the debtor has also
been divested of possession or title. See United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345
U.S. 361, 366 (1953). Concerning this last element of choateness, Professor Kennedy
has commented: "To speak of a lienor with title is of course to utter a legal solecism,
but the incongruities of the doctrine of the inchoate and general lien have never been
a handicap to its development." Kennedy, supra note 5, at 918 n.88 (1954).
18. 67 Stat. 232 (1953). The SBA had only temporary status until 1958, when
Congress made it a permanent establishment and expanded its scope considerably.
72 Stat. 384 (1958), as ~ended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1964). For a thorough presentation
of the historical development of the SBA, see .Barnes, What Government Efforts Are
Being Made To Assist Small Business, 24 LAW&: CoNTEMP. PROB, 3-8 (1959).
19. "Small businesses" are defined under regulations issued by the SBA. The important criteria are generally the number of employees and tlle dollar volume of
business transacted. Small Business Size Standards Regulation, 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-10
(Supp. 1965). Statutory enabling authority for the issuance of such regulations is found
in 72 Stat. 384, 15 U.S.C. § 632 (1958).
20. Among the programs are direct loans for such purposes as construction of
plant and purchase of equipment, loans. made by regular credit channels but guaranteed
by the SBA, "pool loans" made to corporations formed by a number of small business
concerns, disaster loans to aid victims of floods and similar disasters, long-term invest·
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business counselling, and assurance that a fair proportion of government contracting would be done with small businesses.21 As the
SBA was conceived, it was not intended to supplant or compete with
private credit sources but rather to supplement sources of term credit,
fill the existing credit gaps, and encourage more lending by existing
credit sources.22 Like all sources of credit, however, the SBA has been
faced with the problem of collecting from delinquent debtors, and
has undertaken to utilize the inchoate lien doctrine and the general
priority statute for this purpose. The remainder of this comment will
discuss the use of these weapons by the SBA and the undesirable
effects that have resulted from that use, and will recommend changes
which appear beneficial.
II. UTILIZATION BY THE SBA OF R.S. § 3466 AND THE DOCTRINE
OF THE INCHOATE LIEN
A. Implementation of R.S. § 3466
The development of the Small Business Administration's priority
among creditors appears to have received its initial impetus from
SBA v. McClellan, 23 the first United States Supreme Court case considering the relative priority of SBA claims. In McClellan, the SBA
executed a deferred participation agreement with a bank providing
for an assumption by the SBA of a seventy-five per cent share of any
loss accruing to the bank on the loan. 24 The bank thereafter made the
loan to the debtor, who executed a note payable to the bank. After
ment loans for small business development, loans to state and local development com•
panics, active programs for procuring government contracts for small business concerns,
and programs for management and technical assistance. See generally Gilbertson, Small
Business Financing Under the Small Business Act and the Small Business Investment
Act of 1958, 8 KAN. L. REv. 538 (1960); Mccallum, Loans by the Small Business Ad·
ministration, 13 Bus. LAw. 349 (1958).
21. See 72 Stat. 384, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1964), which recognizes the
strength of small business concerns as a major factor in assuring national economic
well-being and the preservation of full and free competition.
22. See 72 Stat. 387, 394 (1958), 15 U.S.C. §§ 636, 642 (1964), declaring as congressional
policy that no financial assistance shall be extended unless not otherwise available on
reasonable terms. But see The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 27, 1965, p. 8, col. 1, for an
editorial contending that the actual practice is not so limited.
23. 364 U.S. 446 (1960).
24. Participation loans are made jointly by the SBA and a private lending institution. There are two types of participation loans-immediate and deferred. In the case
of an immediate participation loan, which is to be used only when deferred participa•
tion loans are not available, the SBA purchases a certain percentage of the loan at
the time it is granted. In a deferred participation loan, the private institution makes
and administers the entire loan, and the SBA merely agrees to purchase from the bank
a fixed portion of the outstanding balance at any time during the stated period. A
direct loan from the SBA to a business concern may be made only if no participation
credit is available, See generally Small Business Act § 7(a), 72 Stat. 387 (1958), 15
U.S.C. § 636 (1964). The participation loan program has since been discontinued in
favor of a guaranty program and Congress is currently considering a bill which would
enable the SBA to liquidate this program by selling the participation guarantees to
private investors. See The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1966, p. 6, col. 1.
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an involuntary petition in bankruptcy had been filed against the
debtor, the SBA took assignment of the note, filed a claim for the
unpaid balance, and asserted priority for its seventy-five per cent interest in the note. 25 The Supreme Court held that R.S. § 3466 and
the bankruptcy statute were to be read in pari materia; thus, the SBA
was accorded a preference over other general creditors included
within section 64(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.26 Furthermore, it was
held that the preference was not _voided by the SBA's having contracted to give twenty-five per cent of its seventy-five per cent priority
recovery to the participating bank. 27
Several important implications are found in the McClellan decision. First, the holding that the SBA is entitled to the priority of the
United States seems to have established the concept that all agencies
of the federal government are entitled to R.S. § 3466 priority28 in the
absence of a specific legislative provision to the contrary.29 Second,
the approval of the SBA agreement giving the participating bank
twenty-five per cent of the preferred recovery indirectly extends the
federal priority statute to nongovernmental entities cooperating with
the federal government.30 Third, the grant of priority to the federal
government, in disregard of the general rule that the rights of creditors are fixed when bankruptcy proceedings are commenced:31 appears to establish a preference for debts in which the United States
has an equitable interest at the date of the bankruptcy petition in
addition to those debts legally owned by the Government.32
25. The SBA sought priority only for its portion of the loan, since it has been
established that sovereign priority cannot be used for the benefit of debts owing to
private parties. See SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 451 (1960); Nathanson v. NLRB,
344: U.S. 25, 27-28 (1952). See also note 99 infra and accompanying text.
26. In bankruptcy proceedings the priority of debts owing to the United States is
governed by § 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act rather than R.S. § 3466. The Bankruptcy
Act provides for five classes of creditors who are to be fully paid before any other
general creditors. The United States is within the fourth class when seeking tax debts
and within the fifth class when seeking other debts qualifying for priority granted
by other federal laws. In McClellan, the Supreme Court declared that the general
priority provided in R.S. § 3466 is .recognized by § 64(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act,
thereby placing the United States within the fifth class of preferred creditors when
seeking debts qualifying for R.S. § 3466 priority. See SBA v. McClellan, supra note 25,
at 451; 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ~ 64.501 (14th ed. 1964).
27. 364 U.S. at 451.
28. This conclusion seems warranted in light of recent decisions which have unanimously granted priority to the litigating agencies. See cases cited note 9 supra.
These cases appear to have overruled United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U.S.
478 (1930), which denied United States priority for a railroad loan made under the
Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456. The McClellan Court quoted with approval an earlier rejection of Guaranty Trust as follows: "'[O]nly the plainest inconsistency would warrant our finding an implied exception to ••. so clear a command
as that of § 3466."' 364 U.S. at 453. But see notes 87-88 infra and accompanying text.
29. For example, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is prohibited from using
R.S. § 3466. See 62 Stat. 262 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1964).
30. See 364 U.S. at 451-52. But see note 99 infra·and accompanying text.
31. United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200, 207 (1939).
32. See 364 U.S. at 450. But cf. United States v. Marxen, supra note 31 (Federal
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More recent litigation involving the SBA has resulted in further
expansion of the application of R.S. § 3j66. In W. T. Jones rb' Co. v.
Foodco Realty, lnc.,33 the SBA joined in an $85,000 participation
loan made by a bank to the debtor, secured by a trust deed on land
and improvements valued at $25,000. A contractor who had added
$54,500 worth of improvements to the mortgaged land initiated proceedings to enforce his mechanic's lien, claiming priority to the land
and improvements on the basis of state law.34 The SBA intervened
and successfully urged the application of R.S. § 3466 priority for its
claim, even though that claim was inferior to the mechanic's lien
under Virginia law and the application of the priority left the contractor unpaid. Many previous decisions involving federal priority
had favored an unsecured federal claim over a claim preferred by
state law,35 but the decision by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in Foodco is significant for its disregard of the relative priority
under state law of the state-created security interest taken by the fed~
era! government. Furthermore, as the SBA priority claim had been
premised on R.S. § 3466, the court held that it would be inconsistent
to allow the SBA to claim the benefit of the common-law rule that
first in time is first in right,36 and declared itself "bound ... to give
effect to the long-standing congressional declaration of priority,"37
Housing Administration denied priority because it did not become an assignee of
the debtor's note until after the bankruptcy petition was filed). The Supreme Court
in the McClellan case distinguished Marxen on the ground that the SBA participation
loan gives the government a more direct interest in the debt than a FHA indemnity
contract. This distinction would seem to exalt form over substance, because in each
instance the note is originally payable to the private lending institution, and the
government invests no funds until the note is assigned to it. However, the participation
loan forms have recently been changed in an effort to avoid the problem raised by
the Marxen holding. The loan form now states that upon the bankruptcy of the
lender the loan becomes "immediately and simultaneously" payable to the SBA. Interview with Roger L. Campbell, Assistant General Counsel for the Small Business
Administration, Jan. 20, 1966.
33. 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963).
34. Id. at 884 n.4.
35. See, e.g., Illinois ex Tel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946); United States
v. Waddill, Holland &: Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945); United States v. Texas, 314
U.S. 480 (1941).
36. The court's reasoning in this regard appears sound, since the "first in time" test
would result in denial of the federal government's priority if its lien were subsequent
to the competing lien, whereas the chronology of the competing claims docs not
affect priorities under R.S. § 3466. However, in a later case involving competition between an SBA lien and an antecedent state lien, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit avoided an inconsistency in the ;results dictated by R.S. § 3466 and the "first
in time" test by integrating the inchoate lien test with the "first in time" test. As the
state lien was found inchoate and thus ineligible for competition with the federal
lien, the court was able to apply the "first in time" test to prefer the federal government. In Te Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965). See generally note
130 infra and accompanying text, where the combining of the inchoate lien doctrine
with the "first in time" test is criticized.
37. 318 F.2d at 889.
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which it viewed as a repudiation of the old common-law rule in situations meeting the conditions of R.S. § 3466.

B. The SBA and the Inchoate Lien
The doctrine of the inchoate lien, which has been vigorously
criticized by commentators,88 has· also contributed to the development of the Small Business Administration's strength as against competing creditors. The Foodco case demonstrates the typical role of the
doctrine as a supplement to the federal priority legislation.89 Finding
the mechanic's lien to be inchoate due to the lack of title or possession,40 the court granted priority to the SBA, since all federal claims
based on R.S. § 3466 prevail over any competing inchoate liens. 41
However, in dictum the court acknowledged that it is improbable
that any mechanic's lien, even one characterized as "choate," could
prevail over a federal claim.42
In its recent decision in In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 48 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit added another dimension to
the proliferating doctrine of the inchoate lien. Together with two
banks, the SBA had made a participation loan of $100,000 to the
debtor, taking as security a second mortgage on real estate and a
security interest in various personalty. As the first mortgage exhausted
the real estate, the federal government sought priority for its claim to
the proceeds from the debtor's personalty by separately urging R.S.
§ 3466 priority and the doctrine of the inchoate lien. The court accorded the nvo doctrines an independent status, refused to apply R.S.
§ 3466, and granted the SBA preference upon finding the competing
state tax lien inchoate and therefore inferior to the federal security
interest.44 In this case, which appears to be the first federal circuit
court decision using the inchoate lien doctrine to test a lien competing with the SBA's contractual security interest,45 an analogy was
38. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
39. See generally notes 12-17 supra and accompanying text.
40. 318 F.2d at 887-88.
41. See note 17 supra.
42. 318 F.2d at 886. This dictum supports the belief of many commentators that the
Supreme Court holdings make it improbable that a rival lien would ever be favored
over a federal claim premised on R.S. § 3466, since a lien is inchoate until the lienor
attains possession and title, and at that moment the lien dissolves. See Kennedy, supra
note 3, at 727; Note, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1259, 1271 (1963). Supporting the commentators is the history showing that in the nearly four decades since the inchoate lien
doctrine was read into the federal priority statute, no lien has yet b'"en {ound by
the Supreme Court to meet the standards of choateness requisite to overcome federal
priority. Therefore, in the context of claims premised on R.S. § 3466, to speak of the
doctrine of the inchoate lien seems to be a misnomer, since a choate lien is nonexistent. See note 17 supra.
43. 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965).
44. Id. at 401.
45. A holding similar to that in Lehigh is United States v. Menier Hardware No. 1,

1114

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:1107

made to federal tax lien cases which had utilized the "three factor"
test-definiteness as to identity of the lienor, property bound by the
lien, and amount of the lien-for determining choateness.40 The
court then applied this test for a lien competing against the SBA's
contractual lien. 47 Although no reason was advanced why choateness
is only a prerequisite for the privately held lien, the court in Lehigh
assumed without discussion that the federal lien need not be choate.48
Thus, the federal lien was held to be superior to the inchoate state
lien under the "first in time" test, because the state lien was rendered
inoperative by its inchoate status.49
Based on the foregoing cases, the following conclusions can be
drawn concerning the extension of SBA priority: (1) The priority
granted by R.S. § 3466 is directly available to the SBA and indirectly
available to certain nongovernmental entities cooperating with the
SBA; (2) priority in bankruptcy can be obtained for those debts
legally or equitably owned by the SBA at the time of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition; (3) the federal government may claim priority
regardless of the priority accorded by state law to a security interest
taken by the government; (4) either R.S. § 3466 or the inchoate lien
doctrine may be invoked in favor of the federal government's contractual liens; (5) it is doubtful whether any lien will be favored over
a United States claim based on R.S. § 3466.
These judicial developments represent a highly successful court
record for the SBA over the past two years and a remarkable increase
in the power to collect debts owing to the SBA. The need for federal
funds to carry on a program such as Congress envisioned when it enacted the Small Business Act cannot be denied, but it is questionable
whether these funds should be sought by means of the SBA's aggresInc., 219 F. Supp. 448 (!N .D. Tex. 1963), in which the SBA's contractual security
interest was found superior by testing the competing lien by the standards of the
inchoate lien doctrine. The Third Circuit has since applied the Lehigh rationale in
holding the federal lien superior in United States v. Oswald &: Hess Co., 345 F.2d
886 (3d Cir. 1965). Cf. United States v. Latrobe Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.
1957).
46. E.g., United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); United States v. City of New
Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
47. See 341 F.2d at 401, where the court refers to United States v. City of New
Britain, supra note 46. In the latter case a city tax lien had been found to be choate
under the three-factor test. Seemingly unaware of the additional element of choatcness
when used in connection with a R.S. § 3466 claim, the Third Circuit never mentioned
the necessity of the lienor's having title or possession. Sec generally note 17 supra and
accompanying text.
48. The state lien was held to be inchoate because of uncertainty as to amount,
since the state had not received a judgment and the lien was not summarily enforceable.
It would appear that an application of these tests to the federal contractual lien would
lead to the conclusion that it is inchoate. Cf. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331; Note, 43
TEX. L. REv. 418, 420 (1965).
49. "That test [the first-in-time test] requires that a lien competing with one of
the Federal Government must be choate ••••" 341 F.2d at 401.
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sive assertion of the sovereign prerogative of priority to a debtor's
assets. 50

III.

APPRAISAL OF FEDERAL PRIORITY AS EMPLOYED BY THE

SBA

A. The Congressional Intent of Section 17 of the Small Business Act
Section 17 of the Small Business Act51 was enacted in 1958 for
the purpose of subordinati_ng security interests of the SBA to state
and local tax liens, provided applicable state law preferred the tax
liens. 52 The following discussion will attempt to demonstrate that
this congressional intent has been subverted by judicial interpretation of section 17 and by the present application of R.S. § 3466 and
the doctrine of the inchoate lien.
The original draft of the bill which eventually became section 17
explicitly denied the SBA the use of R.S. § 3466; 53 however, the
Senate Subcommittee on Small Business, relying on a letter from the
administrator of the SBA, 54 redrafted the bill. 55 In, recommending
50. This question has been underscored by the Supreme Court's recent rejection
of an SBA attempt to avoid a state coverture law and its criticism of the SBA's
"zealous pursuit of the balance due on a disaster loan." The SBA's position was
characterized as "seeking the unconscionable advantage of recourse to assets for which
it did not bargain." United States v. Yazell, 86 Sup. Ct. 500, 503 (1966).
51. Small Business Act § 17 (1958), 72 Stat. 396, 15 U.S.C. § 646 (1964):
Any interest held by the Administration in property, as security for a loan,
shall be subordinate to any lien on such property for taxes due on the property
to a State, or political subdivision thereof, in any case where such lien would,
under applicable State law, be superior to such interest if such interest were held
by any party other than the United States.
52. See S. REP. No. 1714, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. IO (1958):
It [§ 17J is designed to place SBA claims against the assets of small-business
borrowers m a subordinate position to the claims of State and local tax liens
against such assets. This provision is consistent with other provisions of law and
clarifies the position of the SBA in actions brought to realize its .interest in the
assets of borrowers who have defaulted under SBA loans.
See also H.R. REP. No. 2135, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1958):
This amendment added to the House bill a new section making SBA's security
interest in property subordinate to State and local tax liens on such property in
any case where Small Business Administration's interest would be subordinate to
such tax liens, under State law, if it were an interest held by a person other
-than the United States.
53. "Be it enacted ••• that any debt due the Administration which is outstanding
.•• shall not be entitled to the priority available to the United States pursuant to
section 3466 of the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 191)." S. 3319, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
(~958). This bill, introduced by Senator Payne of Maine, apparently was precipitatec:l
by the SBA's assertion of priority over a lien held by the city of Eagle Lake, Maine.
See 104 CoNG. REc. 2470 (1958).
54. Letter from Wendell B. Barnes to Honorable J. W. Fulbright, May 27, 1958,
in Hearings Before Subcommittee on Small Business of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 3, pt. 2, at 553-54 (1958). This letter
constituted the bulk of the testimony on the proposed bill.
55. See note 51 supra. The form enacted, which was suggested by Administrator
Barnes in his letter to Senator Fulbright, supra note 54, was designed specifically "to
give priority to State and local tax liens over mortgage claims asserted by the Small
Business Administration" while retaining R.S. § 3466 priority against nongovernmental
creditors.
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the adoption of the present more restrictive form of section 17, the
committee appears to have made two important assumptions: (I) that
the federal priority afforded by R.S. § 3466 was relevant only to unencumbered assets of the debtor, 06 and (2) that the SBA urged priority
for its security interests only when the interest was created prior to
the attachment of a competing state or local tax. lien.67 The committee intended to augment the strength of state and local governments
by giving their tax liens priority over SBA security interests which
existed prior to the tax liens whenever state law granted priority to
such liens. 68 Thus, it appears that Congress must have intended the
SBA to have a "sovereign preference" only when the SBA, without a
security interest, competed against a creditor without a state or local
tax lien for the unencumbered assets of an insolvent debtor undergoing administration. 59
56. See letter cited note 54 supra, in which the Administrator commented as follows:
S. 3319 excludes the Administration from use of [§ 3466] in the distribution of
the unenmmbered assets of any debtor of the United States •••• This priority
is not applicable to property which is subject to a lien of any kind. The captioned
bill, therefore, offers little of practical value to local taxing authorities ••••
The real source of conflict 1s property which is subject to both an Administra•
tion mortgage, or deed of trust, and to a local tax lien. Since such property is
encumbered, the priority of [§ 3466] does not come into play. (Emphasis added.)
The quoted statement, which constituted the bulk of the testimony on this point, was
never cliallenged.
57. See letter cited note 54 supra, in which the SBA Administrator stated:
Until recently, we avoided difficulty in most of our summary foreclosures •••
by yielding to the demands of local tax authorities •••• In following this practice,
we recognized that, in many cases, our mortgages might be superior to such tax
liens. It has long been an established rule that .•• the lien which attaches first
in point of time is the superior•••. However, there was doubt about the appli•
cability. of this rule to our mortgages; and, as long as this doubt existed, we felt
justified in our policy of avoiding cliallenge to local tax authorities. On January
20, 1958, the ••• Third Circuit decided ••• that a mortgage lien held by the
United States stands in the same position as a tax lien held by the United States,
and is therefore superior to State or local tax liens, which are later in point of time
(United States v. Ringwood Iron Mines, Inc., 251 F.2d 145 •••). In view of
this holding, we Teluctantly concluded that we have a duty to insist upon the
superiority of our mortgages in all cases where they are prior, in point of time,
to State or local tax liens. (Emphasis added.)
If the SBA was reluctant to claim priority when its lien was prior in time, the com•
mittee would have necessarily assumed that priority would not be asserted when the
federal security interest was later in time.
58. See the House and Senate Reports quoted in note 52 supra. The same conclusion was made by a federal district court when it upheld the priority of state,
and local tax liens. See United States v. Christensen, 218 F. Supp. 722, 723, 729 (D,
Mont. 1963), where it is stated:
The parties agree that the obvious purpose of this statute was to place the
SBA in the position of a private party with respect to the relative priority of its
mortgage liens. • • •
As in the case of federal tax liens, the priority of mortgage liens, held by an
agency of the United States, and state tax liens is governed by the principle that
the first in time is first in right .••• As noted, this principle bas been abrogated
••• to the extent of the taxes themselves by 15 U .S.C.A. § 646.
59. In addition to this sovereign preference, priority not related to sovereignty was
also contemplated where state law did not assert absolute priority for state tax liens.
For an example of state law denying priority to state tax liens subsequent to competing liens or mortgages, see Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 247
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Recent cases, however, have failed to carry out the intent of the
congressional committee. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
has refused to apply section 17 to give priority to states in situations
involving capital stock taxes, 60 corporate loan taxes, 61 corporate net
income taxes, 62 and city service charges. 63 In each instance state priority was denied because the taxes were not on "any particular or
specific property." 64 Furthermore, the court said in dictum that section 17 also required the state lien to be on "the particular property in controversy.'' 65 Thus, that court has limited the effect of section 17 to situations where the state lien arises on the particular
property in controversy because of taxes due on that particular
property. 66
This interpretation of section 17 may be defensible in light of
the language of the statute, but it does not appear to be warranted by
legislative history or congressional policy. Many times throughout
the hearings on section 17, reference was made to the granting of
priority to "~ny" and "all" state and local tax liens; 67 at no time was
there an indication that only a very restricted group of property tax
liens were to be favored. 68 Furthermore, Congress recognized that
state and local governments cannot function without revenue 69 and
F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1957) (construing California law). As previously noted, the intended
restriction ·on sovereign priority has not materialized. SB:t\ priority may be asserted
in all situations, subject to the limited restriction indicated in the text accompanying·
notes 60-66 infra.
·
60. See In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965).
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. United States v. Oswald &: Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3_d Cir•. 1965).
64. See In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1965); United
States v. Oswald &: Hess Co., supra note 63, at 888.
65. In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., supra note 64, at 400.
66. See also two similar holdings by Pennsylvania state courts, which were the sole
authority cited by the Lehigh court in drawing its conclusions on the meaning of
§ 17: Girard Trust Com Exch. Bank v. Herbert Elkins, Inc., No. 4426, Court of
Common Pleas No. 4, Philadelphia, February 14, 1964; First Nat'! Bank v. Scranton
Battery Corp., No. 649, Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna, July 31, 1964. But cf.
United States v. Christensen, 218 F. Supp. 722 (D. Mont. 1963), where the court
favored the state and local property tax liens. Although these tax liens would seemingly
meet even the restrictive tests applied by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
the court indicated that it assumed a much broader interpretation of § 17. See
note 58 supra.
67. See notes 52, 56, and 57 supra.
68. Under the Lehigh test, even the property taxes would not be preferred if the
failure to pay created a general lien on all of the debtor's property.
69. See the remarks made by Senator ?ayne in introducing S. 3319, which eventually
became § 17 of the Small Business Act:
This modification is in accordance with custom and usage in this country
where taxes have always taken precedence over debts. The fact that an agency of
the United States Government is the creditor should not alter the situation. This
legislation is necessary to ••• assure fair treatment to States and localities when
they must compete with the Small Business Association for the remaining assets of
a debtor. 104 CONG. REc. 2470 (1958).
Cf. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Siefken, I Neb. (Unof.) 860, 861, 96 N.W. 603 (1901).
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designed section 17 to prohibit the SBA from interfering with their
revenue collections.7° Finally, upon a consideration of the relative
importance of state and local governmental functions and the relative
insignificance of property taxes to total state revenue,71 the incongruity of the Third Circuit's restricted interpretation becomes readily
apparent.
Although the Lehigh court said nothing to indicate that the doctrine of the inchoate lien might also be used to test the priority of a
state or local tax lien qualifying for section 17 priority, the history
of the expansion of that doctrine strongly suggests the possibility.72 If
a qualifying state or local tax lieri were required to be choate before
section 17 could be utilized, then a state tax lien would be subordinate to SBA security interests even if the bill representing section
17 had been enacted as first introduced.73 If the judiciary should
endorse this hypothesis, the past restrictive interpretations of section
17, which are seemingly contrary to congressional intent, would become irrelevant by virtue of a more complete subversion of congressional intent.
B. Inequitable Consequences Resulting From the Assertion by
the SBA of R.S. § 3466 Priority and the Inchoate Lien Doctrine
1. R.S. § 3466
It would appear difficult to justify the assertion by the SBA of
priority under R.S. § 3466, in light of the lack of a historical basis for
such a use of the section74 and in light of the inequitable results
which are frequently occasioned by the granting of such a priority.
70. This purpose behind the redrafting of § 17 to its present form is clearly
indicated in the statement of Administrator Barnes:
Senator Payne, the author of the bill, explained his intent is to give priority
to State and local tax liens over mortgage claims asserted by the Small Business
Administration against the property of a borrower who is in default on a loan
made by the Administration. I favor such a reform; but I do not believe that the
bill, as drafted, will accomplish it • . . • In its stead, I wish to make a proposal
rthis proposal was enacted as § 17] which will, I believe, accomplish the reform
desired by Senator Payne.
71. For instance, in 1963 property taxes constituted a mere three per cent, on the
average, of total revenue for all states. Furthermore, five states have no state property
tax, and in ten other states the property tax constitutes less than one half of one per
cent of total state revenue. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL .ABSTRACT OF THE UNlTED STATES 430 (85th ed. 1964).
72. For examples of past expansion, see notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text;
Rialto Publishing Co. v. Bass, 325 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1963) (trustee in bankruptcy
successfully invoked doctrine of inchoate lien to attack a lien against debtor's property).
See generally Kennedy, The Inchoate Lien in Bankruptcy: Some Reflections on Rialto
Publishing Co. v. Bass, 17 STAN. L. REv. 793 (1965).
73. Sec the tests for choatencss, note 17 supra, and the improbability that any lien
will be found choate, note 42 supra and accompanying text. If a lien is inchoate, the
question of applicability of § 17 would never be reached, even if § 17 had been
enacted as originally proposed. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., United States v. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832); Rorke v.
Dayrell, 4 Dum. &: E. 402, 100 Eng. Rep. 1087 (K.B. 1791).
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With respect to the historical use of the sovereign prerogative in
bankruptcy, it should be noted that England, the original source of our
federal government's prerogative, has appropriately limited the governmental preference to situations involving obligations arising from
"public acts." 75 When the government deals with private parties in
its role as tax collector, its primary purpose is gathering revenue, and
in carrying out this activity it has no choice of debtors. 76 On the other
hand, the primary purpose of the SBA is to encourage lending to
small businesses on reasonable terms. 77 Furthermore, the SBA not
only has a choice of debtors but also has been admonished by Congress to make only loans which are "of such sound value or so secured
as reasonably to assure repayment." 78 Thus, a c.onsideration of the
reasons for recognizing sovereign priority and of the policy behind
the Small Business Act leads to the conclusion that the extraordinary
priority afforded the Government by R.S. § 3466 should not be extended to the SBA.79
Although the above reasons for precluding the use of R.S. § 3466
by the SBA were rejected by the Supreme Court in SBA v. McClellan, 80 other decisions have recognized their validity. In two earlier
cases the Supreme Court held that R.S. § 3466 had been impliedly
rejected by subsequent congressional acts having purposes and granting powers seemingly inconsiste_nt with federal priority.81 Further75. Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44. See Salter, Priority Accorded
the Sovereign in Bankruptcy: The American and British Views, 63 CoM. L.J. 354 (1958).
Indeed, Congress has often recognized the commercial nature of many governmental
activities and has consented to the imposition of the same standard of liability on the
Government as on the other party to the transaction. See statutes cited note 2 supra.
An authoritative judicial ruling recently denied sovereign immunity from suit in
federal court to a foreign government in a situation where the activity giving rise
to the suit was not of a public nature. See Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General
de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964). The decision is in accord
with the prevailing view in most other countries. See Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 708,
710 (1965).
76. See Note, 63 MICH. L. REv. 944, 949 (1965).
77. See Gilbertson, Small Business Finandng Under the Small Business Act and the
Small Business Investment Act of 1958, S KAN. L. REv. 538, 539, 552 (1960).
78. See Small Business Act § 2[7J(a)(7), 72 Stat. 396 (1958), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 636(a)(7) (1964).
79. Davis v. Pringle, 1 F.2d 860, 864 (4th Cir. 1924), afj'd, 268 U.S. 315 (1925):
"[T)he contractual operations of the federal government and of the states have become
so extensive and so involved with the business of private citizens that priority to the
federal government and to the states, except fol' taxes, would operate as an oppressive
hardship on other creditors of bankrupts." See MacLachlan, Improving the Law of
Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C. IND. & CoMM. L. REv. 73 (1959); Salter, supra note
75; cf. Note, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 828, 833 (1964).
80. 364 U.S. 446, 453 (1960).
81. United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 U.S. 478 (1930) (Transportation Act
of 1920 impliedly rejected federal priority for debts created thereunder); Mellon v.
Michigan Trust, 271 U.S. 236 (1926) (Federal Control Act deemed to give Director
General of Railroads no greater rights than other creditors). The Supreme Court in
Guaranty Trust found that the basic purpose of the statute was to aid railroad credit,
just as aid to the credit of small business concerns is the underlying purpose of the
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more, the sole precedent cited for the Supreme Court's rejection in
McClellan of the argument that governmental priority is inconsistent
with the basic purposes of the Small Business Act was United States
v. Emory, 82 fo which the Court denied the contention that no priority
was intended for debts of the Federal Housing Administration. The
Court reasoned in Emory that the FHA, by claiming federal priority,
would not inhibit the extension of credit by contractors, but, on the
contrary, would encourage such lending, because the loans were frequently paid by the lending institutions directly to the suppliers
furnishing goods and services.83 As was acknowledged by the Fourth
Circuit in Foodco, 84 it has not been the practice of the SBA to require
loan money to go directly to those selling to the debtor; thus, the
underlying theory of Emory would not seem to support the McClellan holding.85
The SBA practices discussed in Foodco not only undermine the
theory supporting Emory, but also highlight a major inequity resulting from the SBA's claim of preference. Relying upon abundant Virginia law establishing priority for those improving real estate by
adding their goods and services,86 the contractor in Foodco added
Small Business Act. The Court held that this purpose was totally inconsistent with
a claim of federal priority, because the preference would make it more difficult to
borrow money from potential lenders aware of this federal preference.
82. 314 U.S. 423 (1941).
. 83. Id. at 431. Beyond the policy argument expressed above, the Supreme Court
in Emory emphasized two factors in distinguishing United States v. Guaranty Trust,
280 U.S •.478 (1930). The Court noted that the National Housing Act considered in
Emory provided for loans without security and for little or no interest, whereas the
Transportation Act loans considered in <;;uaranty Trust provided that adequate
security must be given for all loans and required the charging of 6% interest. The
Small Business Act, like the Transportation Act, requires the SBA to take adequate
security on all loans, note 78 supra, and for an interest rate of 3•5½%• Thus, the
Court's reliance on Emory in according federal priority to the SBA appears questionable.
84. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
85. See note 83 supra. Reliance on Emory, a case involving FHA loans, appears
even more questionable after the recent Supreme Court pronouncement limiting the
SBA's right to disregard state law. In United States v. Yazell, 86 Sup. Ct. 500 (1966),
the Court held that the SBA must abide by a Texas coverture statute. The decision
was premised on the acquiescence by SBA in the application of Texas law implied
from the SBA's individual negotiation with the lender. In contrasting instances where
federal law is correctly applied, the Court distinguished "nationwide act[s] of the
Federal Government, emanating in a single form from a single source" and illustrated
the difference by comparing the individually negotiated SBA loans to the FHA loans
made on contract forms which are identical throughout a particular state. Id. at 504.
Although in Yazell state law was competing with federal common law rather than
a statute such as R.S. § 3466, the Court's reasoning, coupled with its warning that
not even statutory sovereign preferences have been held absolute, id. at 505, suggests
that the use of R.S. § 3466 may be improper where the SBA has individually negotiated
for collateral security. In SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446 (1960), where the Supreme
Court approved the invocation of R.S. § 3466 by the SBA, the loan was made without
collateral. It would thus not require repudiation of the ruling in McClellan if the
Court should hold § 3466 inapplicable in any case where the SBA has bargained for
a state-created security interest.
86. See note 34 supra.

April 1966]

Small Business Administration Liens

1121

$54,500 worth of improvements to the land mortgaged to the participating bank. Because the loan was made by the local bank, the
contractor had no reason to be aware of the Small Business Administration's participation and equity. 87 When proceedings for foreclosure
of the mechanic's lien were instituted, the bank assigned the note and
mortgage to the SBA, which in turn successfully asserted R.S. § 3466
priority in derogation of the contractor's security. It may be doubted
that Congress ever intended to "secure ... public revenue" in such a
manner. 88
A possibility of a further inequity is suggested by the application
of R.S. § 3466 to an SBA mortgage. In Foodco, where a mechanic's
lien was competing against a prior mortgage in favor of the SBA, the
court's decision favoring the SBA could have been premised on the
familiar and orthodox rule that the first in time is the first in right. 89
However, the court applied R.S. § 3466 to the SBA mortgage claim,
distinguishing the "first in time" test as a common-law rule applicable only when the insolvency necessary, to activate R.S. § 3466 is
nonexistent. 00 Although the priority statute may be literally susceptible of application to all kinds of governmental claims, the unfortunate implication of the Foodco reasoning is that the SBA's mortgages
are to be accorded priority regardless of when they were negotiated
and regardless of recordation. 91 This result would be contrary to both
87. The loan agreement made no reference to the SBA and the mortgage was
recorded in the name of the private bank.
88. The usual justification for federal priority is that expressed in Price v. United
States, 269 U.S. 492, 500 (1926): "To secure adequate public revenue to sustain the
public burdens." The comments of the Colorado Supreme Court made in reference
to a case where a mechanic lienor lost to a federal tax lien seem appi:opriate:
I am at a loss to understand how justice could possibly be served by ap•
propriating the labor and materials of workmen to the payment of the tax delinquency of another under the circumstances disclosed by the record in the case at
bar. Abou.t the only rule we can think of that could support such a result is the
one referred to by Mr. Justice Burke in People v. Kilpatrick, 79 Colo. 303, 245
Pac. 719, as follows:
"The good ole rule, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power
And they should keep who can."
United States v. Vorreiter, 134 Colo. 543, 551, 307 P.2d 475, 479 (1957). See also United
States v. Latrobe Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357, 363 (8th Cir. 1959), where the court felt
compelled to answer the equitable claims of the party losing to the government lien
by noting that the losing party acted after the mortgage had been recorded in the
name of the United States.
89. See, e.g., Southwest Engine Co. v. United States, 275 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1960); .
United States v. Ringivood Iron Mines, Inc., 251 F.2d 145 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 974 (1958). The Southwest Engine case reaches the "first in time" test by equating
the contractual security with the tax lien and then applying the rule stated in United
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), which involved competing tax liens.
90. See W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881, 888-89 (4th Cir.
1963). But see In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1965), where
the court rejected the inconsistency argument advanced by the Foodco court. See gen•
erally note 36 supra.
91. R.S. § 3466 gives priority to the federal government regardless of when its
debt arises so long as it exists at the time the priority attaches. See note 32 supra and
accompanying text.
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existing precedent92 and the reasonable expectations of parties dealing with the mortgagor. Carried to its ultimate conclusion, this rationale would allow a second mortgage held by the SBA to prevail
over first mortgage on the same property held by a private entity.93
Further unjust· consequences of SBA priority are demonstrated
by the McClellan decision. 94 The creditors competing for the assets
of the bankrupt borrower could reasonably have assumed that they
were entitled to share the debtor's assets equally with the lending
bank.95 After the bank unsuccessfully sought priority, however, it
assigned the unsecured note to the SBA; this assignment resulted in
subordination of general creditors to a $12,266 debt, 96 an outcome
which clashes with the Bankruptcy Act's attempt to achieve a fair
distribution of assets. Although the McClellan result is favorable to
the participating bank, it should be pointed out that participating
banks unfamiliar with these priority rules may also be injured by
the SBA preference. It is established that a participating bank may
not claim priority for its share of the loan; 97 thus, the bank would
also be subordinated to the Small Business Administration's portion
of the loan even though it had contributed to the SBA program and
had thus furthered the basic purposes of the Small Business Act.
Although the participating institution can protect itself to some
extent by contracting with the SBA for a portion of the amount ultimately recovered by the SBA, this procedure reveals additional inequities resulting from the Small Business Administration's use of
R.S. § 3466. Under this ancillary contract, a nongovernmental entity
is indirectly given the advantages of federal priority. In Nathanson v.
NLR.B,98 the Supreme Court denied federal priority to the National
Labor Relations Board when it sought to assert governmental priority
for employees' claims under a backpay order against a bankrupt em-

a

92. See United States v. County of Iowa, 295 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Rocssling, 280 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1960); Southwest Engine Co. v. United States, 275
F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Ringwood lron Mines, Inc., 251 F.2d 145
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 974 (1958). But cf. United States v. City of New Britain,
347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954); In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1965).
The latter case was subsequent to the Foodco decision and presents a theory which
gives the United States priority in nearly every situation, whether or not the debtor
is insolvent. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
93. A first mortgage, at least in a lien theory state, seems vulnerable as an inchoate
lien when tested against the rigorous standards imposed by the Supreme Court in such
cases as Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946), and United States v,
Waddill, Holland &: Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945). See also Bank of Wrangell v.
Alaska Asiatic Lumber Mills, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Alaska 1949).
94. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
95. Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1964).
96. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
97. See SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 451 (1960); Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S.
25, 27-28 (1952); W. T. Jones &: Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881, 889-90 (1963).
98. 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
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ployer. The Court reasoned that "it does not follow that because the
Board is an agency of the United States, any debt owed it is a debt
owing the United States within the meaning of R.S. § 3466 . . . .
There is no function here of assuring public revenue. The beneficiaries of the claims are private persons .... " 99 The Supreme Court,
while reaffirming the reasoning of Nathanson,1° 0 rejected a similar
argument made in the McClellan case, distinguishing the latter on
the factual difference that the money sought "was loaned by ... and
due to, the United States."101 Nevertheless, to grant priority to a debt
legally owned by the United States but equitably owned by a private
creditor, while denying priority to a debt created by a federal agency
but owned by a private person, seems to exalt form over substance
and result in discrimination among competing private creditors. Furthermore, this discriminatory grant of federal priority to a private
bank is without underlying policy support102 and is logically indefensible, except to the extent that the ancillary contract for a portion
of the SBA's preferred recovery induced the bank's participation.103
In summary, the recent extension of R.S. § 3466 priority to mortgages held by the SBA has little support in either the historical basis
of R.S. § 3466 or the purposes of the Small Business Act, and has
led to many inequities; moreover, the potential for the further expansion of the sovereign priority, with an attendant increase in the
hardships thus created, appears large.

2. Doctrine of the Inchoate Lien
In two recent decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit utilized the doctrine of the inchoate lien to hold a prior state
tax lien inferior to a contractual security interest.104 This combination of the inchoate lien doctrine and a government contractual
security interest appears to have little supporting precedent or
justification.
99. Id. at 27-28.
100. SBA v. McClellan, 364 U.S. 446, 451 (1960).
IOI. Ibid.
102. Such a use of the federal priority in no way helps "to secure adequate public
revenue," see note 88 supra, since to assert priority for a private bank benefits only
that particular bank in its collection of revenue.
103. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 909, 914-15 (1960). Although such an expectation
may have been an inducing factor in the contract in the McClellan case, it offers no
justification for the SBA's promise to give the bank 10% of its preferred recovery in
Foodco, in which the contract was not made until after the bank loan was made and
bankruptcy initiated. In fact, the promise of 10% of the priority recovery appears to
have been a gift by the SBA to the bank, since the only "consideration" given by the
bank was an assignment of its uncollectible 10% interest in the loan.
104. United States v. Oswald & Hess Co., 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1965); In re Lehigh
Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965).
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a. Federal Common Law

Before scrutinizing the consequences flowing from this extension
of the inchoate lien doctrine, one must question the appropriateness
of applying any federal common-law rule.105 The question of defining
the proper bounds of the federal common law has plagued the
judiciary ever since the Supreme Court declared in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins106 that, "except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the state."107 In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 108 the Supreme Court limited the Erie doctrine by holding
that the constitutional authority for the issuance of United States
commercial paper entitled the federal judiciary to create uniform
rules governing that paper.109 Emanating from the sweeping rationale of this limitation of Erie have been a number of decisions favoring federal decisional law over state statutory rules
in the area of the federal government's security transactions.11° Re105. This inquiry is not relevant to a claim premised on § 8466, since the Constitution's supremacy clause would require the application of the relevant federal
statute.
'
106. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
107. Id. at 78. Although it is arguable that the Erie diversity doctrine is not directly
applicable in the SBA cases since jurisdiction rests on the basis of a federal question,
it is generally believed that the reasoning of Erie pervades all cases in the federal
courts regardless of the ground for federal jurisdiction. See Maternally Yours, Inc. V,
Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.l (2d Cir. 1956), where the court stated:
But despite repeated statements implying the contrary, it is the source of the
right sued upon, and not the ground on which federal jurisdiction over the case
is founded, which determines the governing law. Sec Hart &: Wechsler, The
Federal Courts and the Federal System (1953) 690-700. Thus the Erie doctrine
applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which
has its source in state law.
108. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See generally Clark, State Law in Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Friendly, In
Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 883 (1964).
109. In Clearfield the Supreme Court considered whether the federal government
was prohibited from recovering money paid on a forged check because of its failure
to notify the defendant of the forgery within the time prescribed by state law, The
Court's disregard of state law was premised primarily on the constitutional and
statutory source of the power to issue checks and on the vast scale of the cxercise of
this power in the different states. The Court reasoned that the decisional rule should
not be determined by state law because the federal government's rights and duties
should be uniform throughout the nation. See generally Comment, 6 B.C, IND. &:
CoMM. L. REv. 898, 900-06 (1955): Note, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 991 (1953). Clearfield
became the principal case supporting the growth of a new, but more restricted,
federal common law. Even where nondiversity federal jurisdiction exists, however,
federal common law is the proper rule of decision only when the question relates to
a federal function of overriding importance. See Hart, The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 CoLuM. L. REv. 489, 509-15 (1954); Mishkin, The 'Yariousness of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules
for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797-801 (1957): Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 1236-37 (1964).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Sylacauga Propertie3, Inc., 323 F.2d 487 (5th Cir,
1963): United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963): United States v. View Crest
Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1959). But see Bumb v. United States, 276
F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960) (upholding the use of state law for determining the validity
of an SBA mortgage). See generally Comment, supra note 109, at 909-13.
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cently, in United States v. Yazell, 111 the Supreme Court more clearly
defined the Clearfield doctrine by introducing a new consideration
-the extent of individual negotiation-for determining whether, in
any given situation, uniform implementation and protection of
federal interests demands the application of federal common law. 112
Characterizing the problem as one presenting the "inevitable conflict
between federal interest and state law," 113 the Court held that the
SBA must abide by the Texas coverture statute in collecting a note
secured by a mortgage which had been "individually negotiated in
painfully particularized detail, and . . . with specific reference to
Texas law." 114 Mr. Justice Fortas' opinion makes it clear that the
basic issue of whether there is a "federal interest" sufficient to preempt state law will not be answered by a mere showing of constitutional or congressional authority for the underlying act. 115 Rather,
111. 86 Sup. Ct. 500 (1966). The SBA, negotiating through local counsel familiar
with Texas law, made a disaster loan to Mr. and Mrs. Yazell, who returned a note
and mortgage signed by each of them. Following default by the Yazells, the SBA sought
enforcement of the mortgage against Mrs. Yazell's personal property. The Texas
coverture statute denies married women the power to mortgage their personal
property. The SBA contended, however, that this statute should be disregarded in
favor of a federal common-law rule granting women such power. The SBA predicated
its argument on Clearfield.
112. The consideration of whether the federal interest is sufficient to warrant appli•
cation of a federal rule has been the initial step in analyzing whether federal or state
law should be controlling. If sufficient federal interest is found, then the courts
typically weigh the federal and state interests to determine whether it is necessary
to disregard completely the applicable state law. See National Metropolitan Bank v.
United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943). See generally Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 1236, 1241-43 (1964).
113. 86 Sup. Ct. 500, 502 (1966).
114. Id. at 503.
115. In the past the lower federal courts have indicated that sufficient federal
interest could be demonstrated by a mere reference to federal authority and financial
interests. See, e.g., United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963). This has been
especially true in the area of federal contracts. See Polfcher, The Choice of Law, State
or Federal, in Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 LA. L. REv. 37 (1951); Note,
45 CALIF. L. REv. 212 (1957). The looseness with which courts approached the analysis
of a sufficient federal interest has prompted one commentator to state:
JTlhe Supreme Court, even during the years while it has beeo diligently
tenaitig Eiie, has, almost unconsciously as it were, been allowing a vast new growth
of nonstatutory federal decisional law to spring up and run wild. Since Erie it
~as been discovered, for example, that the law applicable to any transaction to
which the Federal Government, in any of its capacities, is a party is federal law;
if there is no applicable federal statute, the court is free to improvise and need
not follow the law of any state.
Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1046-47 (1961).
The failure of the courts to define the federal interest carefully also prompted
Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Clearfield, to issue a warning against the broad
interpretation of the Clearfield doctrine:
As respects the creation by the federal court of common-law rights, it is perhaps needless to state that we are not in the freewheeling days antedating Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. The instances where we have created federal common law are few and restricted. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, we created federal common law to govern transactions in the commercial
paper of the United States; and we did so in view of the desirability of a uniform
rule in that area. Id., p. 367. But even that rule was qualified in Bank of America
v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29.
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
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"solicitude for state interests" demands a showing of "clear and substantial interests of the national govemment" 116 by consideration of
such factors as: (1) whether the underlying federal act is one "emanating in a single form from a single source" rather than an "individually negotiated contract"; 117 (2) whether the related program is
one "which [is] and must be uniform throughout the Nation"; 118 (3)
whether the implementation of state law will raise the additional
problem of which state law is applicable; 119 and (4) whether the
burden of complying with state law would hinder the federal program.120 Testing the SBA loan program by these criteria reveals that
generally the loans are individually negotiated, 121 the loan collection
process is tailored to meet the peculiar situation of each borrower,122
situations involving competing state laws arise infrequently, 123 and
SBA personnel are directed to comply with state law.124 These factors
support the Court's conclusion that SBA loans do not involve a sufficient federal interest to warrant disregarding the "quaint doctrine"
of coverture.125 It would seem that a consideration of the same factors
should provide a sound basis for distinguishing the federal tax lien
116. 86 Sup. Ct. at 507.
117. Id. at 504. The Court cited Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363
(1943) and United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963), as examples of cases
where the federal act issued on a single form from a single source. The latter case
presented the same basic issue as Yazell; the only difference was that the loan had
been made by the FHA rather than the SBA. The Court found this difference significant
because FHA loan contracts are made on a single form common to all loans made in
a particular state rather than on contracts arrived at through individual negotiation.
118. 86 Sup. Ct. at 507. The Court distinguished these cases involving federal acts
demanding uniform treatment: Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 117
(remedial rights with respect to federal commercial paper); United States v. Allegheny
County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) (taxing of property of the United States); D'Ocnch,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (rights of FDIC as an insurer).
119. The Court, at 509 n.34, cited Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S.
289 (1941), as an example of Supreme Court adoption of state law. In Royal Indemnity
there was no question of which state law to apply, since the contract was made and
was to be performed in a single state.
120. 86 Sup. Ct. at 509. For instance, the treasury would be greatly inconvenienced
if required to meet state rules prior to the creation of federal tax liens. Cf. United
States v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291 (1961).
121. See 86 Sup. Ct. at 504. It would seem that the participation and guaranty
loans undenvritten by the SBA would be even more individualistic, as they are nego•
tiated for the SBA by independent lenders who are primarily interested in local law.
See generally note 24 supra.
122. Such factors as the collateral taken, the other property owned by the borrower,
and the utility of different creditors' remedies would vary the collection procedure.
123. No SBA case has been discovered in which a conflict-of-laws question arose.
124. See 86 Sup. Ct. at 509 n.35, where the Court quoted from the Financial
Assistance Manual of the Small Business Administration, SBA-500, which the Court
characterized as "replete with admonitions to follow state law carefully."
125. See also Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960), where a state
bulk sales statute was found controlling despite the SBA's contention that federal law
controlled. The Supreme Court approved this application of state law. Sec 86 Sup.
Ct. 504 n.13. But see Note, 50 VA. L. R.Ev. 1236 (1964), favoring the application of
federal common law in Yazell.
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cases126 and for rejecting the Third Circuit's application of the inchoate lien doctrine to favor an SBA lien over prior state tax liens. 127
In Lehigh and in United States v. Oswald & Hess Co)28 it was
assumed by the Third Circuit without discussion that federal common law was appropriate.
b. Inequitable Consequences of the Inchoate Lien Doctrine
The court in the Lehigh and Oswald & Hess cases drew upon a
federal tax lien case129 to apply the "first in time" rule. However,
because this "general equitable principle" would have given priority
to the state and local tax liens, the court incorporated the inchoate
lien doctrine to test the state and local liens. 130 In essence, the court
declared that although the lien first in time would have priority,
the liens competing against the federal lien must be choate in order
for this test to be applied.
This pernicious combination of the "first in time" test and the
inchoate lien doctrine has developed in cases involving the federal
tax lien. 131 The SBA brief in Lehigh acknowledged this fact but
argued that decisions by four different courts of appeals established the applicability of the doctrine to federal contractual liens. 132 Although the court accepted this contention without question, 133 the
126. Using federal common law to test the priority of federal tax liens appears
appropriate under 'the Yazell considerations: (1) The underlying act of taxation appears to be the classic example of an act "emanating in a single form from a single
source"; (2) the tax collection process is given uniformity by the federal statute creating
a federal tax lien, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6321-25; (3) the conflict-of-laws consideration would be minimal; (4) as the tax lien arises by operation of federal law,
there is no need to comply with state law in order to create it. Furthermore, Congress
has stated the specific instances in which tax lien priority is dependent upon state
law. See INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6323{a), which declares that "the lien imposed by
section 6321 shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed • . • [in the designated office where
the property is located]." Thus, three of the four considerations indicate a federal
interest sufficient to pre-empt state law.
127. See notes 121-24 supra.
128. 345 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1965).
129. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
130. The limited Clearfield doctrine presents no greater obstacle to the application
of the inchoate lien doctrine in tax lien cases than was encountered by the "first in
time" test. However, the desirability of its use is of much greater doubt. See generally
articles cited note 3 supra.
131. See, e.g., United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). Although
primarily used in tax lien cases, the inchoate lien doctrine has been applied infrequently in other contexts. See Rialto Publ_ishing Co. v. Bass, 325 F.2d 527 (9th Cir.
1963); United States v. Latrobe Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1957).
132. See Brief for the Small Business Administration, p. 31, In re Lehigh Valley
Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1965), in which the SBA cited the following: United
States v. County of Iowa, 295 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. Roessling,
280 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1960); Southwest Engine Co. v. United States, 275 F.2d 106
(10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Ringwood Iron Mines, Inc., 251 F.2d 145 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 974 (1958).
133. In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., supra note 132, at 401. The district court
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holdings in these four cases appear to offer little support for the
SBA's argument. In each of the cited cases the Government, asserting a contractual security interest, prevailed over a competing lienor.
However, each holding was predicated on a finding that the federal
lien was prior in time; 184 thus, there was no need to rely on the
inchoate lien test. The requirement of choateness was not mentioned
in any of the cases.
However, the Third Circuit's rationale does have at least a tenuous basis in precedent. In Southwest Engine Co. v. United States,18G
the Tenth Circuit analogized the Small Business Administration's
mortgage to a federal tax lien186 and gave the SBA priority by applying the "first in time" principle. In a similar case considering the
priority of a loan under the Emergency Relief Priority Act,187 the
Fifth Circuit applied the "first in time" test, saying, "That rule governing the priority of federal tax liens has been applied to federal
mortgage liens as well." 188 From these decisions borrowing the "first
in time" test from federal tax lien cases, the premise is arguable that
the inchoate lien doctrine can also be borrowed for the same
purpose.1so
Upon closer examination, however, the justification by inference
from precedent disappears. In the first place, the factors outlined in
the Yazell opinion offer sound bases for distinguishing the foreclosure of an SBA lien from the foreclosure of a federal tax lien140
and therefore suggest that the use of any federal common-law doctrine by the SBA cannot be predicated on an application of that
doctrine in federal tax lien cases.141 Second, the cases previously ?orapparently rejected the application of the inchoate lien doctrine in favoring the city
tax lien, 225 F. Supp. 494 (E.D. Pa. 1964), and commented as follows: "Even applying
'.the first in time first in right' principle enunciated by United States v. City of New
Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1953), the same result would occur." Id. at 497.
134. See United States v. County of Iowa, 295 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1961); United
States v. Roessling, 280 F.2d 933, 936 (5th Cir. 1960); Southwest Engine Co. v. United
States, 275 F.2d 106, 107 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Ringwood Iron Mines, Inc.,
251 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1958).
135. 275 F.2d 106 (10th Cir. 1960).
136. Id. at 107.
137. United States v. Roessling, 280 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1960).
138. Id. at 936.
139. In Lehigh neither the Third Circuit nor the SBA revealed any policy arguments
in favor of extending the use of the inchoate lien doctrine from federal tax liens to
federal contractual security interests. The court's opinion is silent in this regard, and
the SBA brief contains only a footnote citing the cases in note 134 supra. The court's
lack of explanation suggests ·that the inchoate lien test was thought to be merely an
aspect of the "first in time" test. As indicated in the text accompanying notes 141•43
infra, however, this is an erroneou~ suggestion.
140. Compare notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text with note 126 supra.
141. But see United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.
1959), where the court separated federal security transactions into two phases-the
"planning and working" phase and the "collecting" phase-and suggested the use of
state law for the former and federal law for the latter, since commercial convenience
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rowing the "first in time" test from tax lien cases did not in any
way intimate that rules applicable to either federal tax liens or contractual security interests were necessarily interchangeable. In fact,
interchangeability appears illogical, considering the contrast between
the general commercial nature of a contractual security interest individually negotiated and consummated under the state law governing security transactions,142 and the tax lien arising by operation of
law for the purpose of securing tax obligations owed by members of
the public. Third, "first in time" is an ancient rule developed for
resolving disputes between rival private lienors143 and has been applied broadly in all types of priority situations,144 whereas the inchoate lien doctrine originated in a case involving competing tax
claimants145 and has been applied almost exclusively in tax claim
disputes.146
The widespread condemnation by the commentators of the inchoate lien doctrine as applied in construing RS. § 3466 and the
federal tax lien law would seem to militate against its further expansion.147 Among the, many criticisms of the doctrine which have
been advanced are that it leads to discrimination between "choate"
and "inchoate" liens for no apparent reason, 148 in~oduces great uncertainty into security interests in general, 149 and has an adverse
effect upon business and upon total Government revenue. 160 All of
these criticisms are equally applicable to the inchoate lien doctrine
as it pertains to contractual liens.
1

is dominant in the former and federal policy is dominant in the latter. The Ninth
Circuit seems since to have abandoned this line of reasoning. See Hendry v. United
States, 305 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1962).
142. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
143. See Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1827).
144. See, e.g., United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) (tax: lien
priority); Rankin v. Scott, supra note 143 (priority of judgment liens).
145. See County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929); Kennedy, The
Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate
and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 911-19 (1954).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Vermont, 377 U.S. 351 (1964); United States v. Texas,
314 U.S. 480 (1941); New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933). But see Rialto Publishing
Co. v. Bass, 325 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1963), where a bankruptcy trustee used the inchoate
lien doctrine to attack a lien on the bankrupt's property. However, this extension of
the doctrine appears improper and is unlikely to be followed. See Kennedy, The Inchoate Lien in Bankruptcy: Some Reflections on the Rialto Publishing Co. v. Bass,
17 STAN. L. R.Ev. 793 (1965). United States v. Latrobe Constr. Co., 246 F.2d 357 (8th
Cir. 1957), is another isolated instance of an application of the inchoate lien doctrine
outside the tax: lien area.
147. See articles cited note 3 supra; Report of the Special Committee on Federal
Liens, 84 A.B.A. REP. 645 (1959).
148. See Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal
Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 IowA L. R.Ev. 724, 750-51 (1965).
149. See Kennedy, supra note 146, at 820; Reeve, The Relative Priority of Government and Private Liens, 29 ROCKY MT. L. R.Ev. 167 (1957).
150. See MacLachlan, Improving the Law of Federal Liens and Priorities, 1 B.C.
IND. 8: COMM. L. R.Ev. 73, 74-76 (1959).
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A particularly objectionable aspect of the inchoate lien doctrine
is its discriminatory application.151 The federal contractual lien in
Lehigh was as incapable of meeting the tests of choateness as were
the state liens; 152 thus, no greater equity should exist in favor of the
federal lien. Although the desire for uniformity may offer some
basis for developing and enforcing federal common law, there appears to be no justification for the judiciary's overriding a state rule
to "legislate" a priority for the federal government by testing only
the nonfederal liens by the inchoate lien doctrine.
In summary, the Third Circuit's utilization of the inchoate lien
doctrine on behalf of the SBA appears indefensible because the
Clearfield doctrine as interpreted by Yazell militates against the use
of any federal common-law doctrine in contests between SBA liens
and the liens of competing creditors,153 because the previous appli•
cation of the doctrine in federal tax lien cases affords no proper
foundation for its invocation by the SBA, and because the use of the
doctrine to test only those liens competing against the federal liens
produces unwarranted discrimination.
Another serious objection to the extended use of the inchoate
lien doctrine is that it presents an opportunity for major abuse. If
in the Lehigh case the private banks had been forced to seek recovery for their individual portions of the loan, the inchoate lien
doctrine would have been unavailable to them in their competition
with other private creditors. However, the application of the doctrine
in Lehigh indirectly conferred federal priority on the banks' claims.
This would appear to be in conflict with the categorical denial by
the Supreme Court in Nathanson and McClellan of the extension
to private creditors of priority under R.S. § 3466 and section 64(a)(5)
of the Bankruptcy Act. 154 Furthermore, it would seem to be a perversion of the statutory purpose behind the federal priority provisions for the SBA, a public agency, to assert discriminately the questionable doctrine of the inchoate lien in favor of certain private
creditors.
151. The federal contractual security interest has not been subjected to the inchoate
lien test. See Note, 43 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 418, 420 (1965), criticizing the failure to apply the
test to federal tax liens.
152. The state and local tax liens were found to be inchoate in Lehigh because
the amount of the lien was uncertain. In order for the amount of the lien to be
sufficiently certain, "the lienor must either have obtained judgment on the lien or it
must be enforceable against the property by summary proceeding." In re Lehigh
Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir. 1965). Since the SBA did not have a
judgment or a summarily enforceable lien, its lien was also uncertain and thus could
not have met the test for choateness.
153. See notes 108-27 supra and accompanying text.
154. These denials were made when § 3466 priority was sought for private claims,
but seem equally appropriate where the inchoate lien doctrine is being used to benefit
certain private creditors to the detriment of others. See generally notes 98-103 mpra
and accompanying text.
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Considering the past expansion of the doctrine, 155 its further
growth within the sphere of the Small Business Act is not inconceivable. Recently, those liens Congress has designated for protected status
when competing with unfiled federal tax liens have been required by
the Supreme Court to attain choateness before being allowed to
benefit from their preferred status.156 Similarly, it is conceivable that
this "judicial amendment" will also be extended to those liens which
qualify for the special priority of section 17 of the Small Business
Act.157 Such an application of the inchoate lien test would emasculate
section 17,158 since it is doubtful whether any liens would be found
choate. 159
Other possible extensions of the doctrine are suggested by its
past expansion. For instance, in the factual setting of Lehigh it
would be as plausible for the SBA to attack the privately held first
real estate mortgage as being inchoate as it was for the SBA to assert
the inchoateness of the state tax liens, since both rely entirely upon
state law for their vitality. 160 Thus, if the Lehigh rationale were to
be utilized in this situation, the second mortgage of the SBA on real
estate would be elevated above the privately held first mortgage on
the same real estate, a result which appears totally unconscionable.
The above illustrations clearly indicate that the present and potential unfairness resulting from the judiciary's recourse to R.S. § 3466
and the inchoate lien doctrine on behalf of the SBA demands forthright remedial action.
IV.

IMPROVING THE PRESENT LAW

There are three possible approaches to the problem of improving
the present law concerning the priority of the SBA-self-help by
individual creditors, amendment of state law, and federal legislation. A satisfactory solution to this federal problem demands federal
legislation, but the other means of improvement may provide some
limited interim relief.
155. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
156. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 6323 provides that the federal tax lien shall be
ineffective against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor who had no
notice of the tax lien. However, in United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84
(1963), the Supreme Court significantly qualified the statutory protection accorded
mortgagees (and pledgees and judgment creditors) by requiring them to have a choate
lien before invoking § 6323. See generally Kennedy, supra note 148, at 730-35.
157. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text.
158. Even if § 17 had been enacted as first introduced, see note 53 supra, it would
be ineffective if the liens were required to be choate before prevailing over the federal
liens.
159. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
160. Cf. United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963), where the United
States, claiming under a tax lien, successfully attacked a competing mortgage because
the amount of the mortgage was uncertain. See generally Note, 43 MINN. L. REv. 755
(1959).
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There are several ways in which an individual creditor might try
to protect himself, but all are too limited to be of real significance.
For instance, the ancillary contracts between the participating banks
and the SBA in the Foodco and McClellan cases represent means by
which an individual creditor can "ride the coattails" of federal priority. The same type of contract might conceivably be demanded by all
creditors who are aware of a previous loan to the debtor by the SBA.
However, even if the SBA acceded to such a demand and the lender
ultimately recouped some of his loss by receiving a share of the
SBA's priority recovery, this "solution" would merely compound the
difficulty by giving another nongovernmental creditor the benefit
of federal priority.161 Another means of self-help which could be
utilized by purchase-money creditors aware of the debtor's financial
problems would be the use of consignment. In United States v.
Menier Hardware No. 1, Inc., 162 a federal district court allowed a
consignor to recover the consigned goods on the theory that since
the goods were never the property of the debtor the federal security
interest never attached to them.163 The effectiveness of the consignment method is severely limited, however, by the difficu~ty of establishing a true consignment. In addition, the added risks necessarily
carried by a true consignor164 would frequently outweigh the risk of
losing a debt collection because of federal priority. Still another
m~ans of self-help is to encourage a failing debtor to seek a Chapter
XI arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act.165 It has been held that
the receiver appointed under Chapter XI is not a general receiver
and that the appointment is therefore not an act of bankruptcy.100
Thus, the SBA may be deprived of the use of R.S. § 3466 priority •
because the debtor's insolvency had not been manifested in any of
the ways specified by that section.107 At best, self-help can be considered no better than severely limited stopgap relief.
There may be situations where a change in state law would alleviate the unfairness inherent in the SBA's assertions of federal
priority for its liens. It is highly doubtful, however, whether any
change in state law would provide satisfactory permanent relief for
private creditors competing with SBA liens. One possible measure at
the state level would be legislation directed at the elements of choateness for liens created by state law. Such legislation would seem espe161. See notes 98-103 supra and accompanying text.
162. 219 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Tex. 1963).
163. Id. at 459-68; accord, Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960); United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), both of which develop the "no property" rule in the
context of the tax lien.
164. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
165. 52 Stat. 905 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1964).
166. See United States v. National Furniture Co., 348 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Clover Spinning Mills Co., 244 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.S.C. 1965).
167. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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cially appropriate for statutory liens such as those asserted by the
state in the Lehigh case. By authorizing a summary proceeding for
the enforcement of statutory liens against certain property, the state
could eliminate one of the factors relied on in categorizing certain
liens as inchoate.168 Also, state legislatures could make property tax
liens apply solely to the specific property taxed rather than to the
debtor's entire property, thus enabling such liens to qualify under
section 17 of the Small Business Act. 169 In addition to the many
obvious and specific arguments against implementation of these suggestions,170 there is the more basic objection that the creation of new
obstacles to federal debt collection by states desiring to beriefit their
citizens against other citizens has a tendency to develop new problems
and encourage disrespect for the federal govef?ment.171 Thus, although the above means of self-help and changes in state laws might
aid a debtor in a few specific circumstances, the improvement, if any,
over the present situation would be minimal.
The best solution to the priority problem is congressional action.
Many proposals intended to solve general federal priority problems
have been submitted to Congress.172 Since the more drastic proposals
-those calling for the general elimination of R.S. § 3466 and the inchoate lien doctrine-have not met with success,173 it seems desirable
to suggest several less extensive reforms by which the unfairness of
the SBA priority could be alleviated. A minimum provision which
would go far in eliminating deception from SBA participation loans
would be one imposing a notice-filing requirement for all private
loans in which the SBA has an equitable interest.174 Such a requirement would ensure that subsequent creditors were warned of possible
competition from the federal government. Another relatively simple
measure would be to prohibit the SBA from contracting away a portion of the preferred recovery afforded by R.S. § 3466. This would
eliminate the unfairness, illustrated by Foodco, of indirectly allowing
a certain private creditor the use of federal statutory priority.175 Al168. In discussing the requirement of certainty of amount, the Lehigh court said that
an amount would be certain if judgment was obtained or the lien was enforceable by
summary proceedings. See In re Lehigh Valley Mills, Inc., 341 F.2d 398, 401 (3d Cir.
1965).
169. See notes 64-66 supra and accompanying text.
I 70. For instance, it is likely total collection risks will be less if a state's tax
lien covers all of the taxpayer's property, even though the lien is thereby prevented
from qualifying for the advantages of § 17.
171. See MacLachlan, supra note 150, at 82.
172. See, e.g., H.R. 11256, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); H.R. 7915, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959). See generally Kennedy, supra note 148, .at 750-54; Kennedy, supra note 145, at
932-35; MacLachlan, supra note 150, at 82-85; The Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1966,
p. 1, col. 5 (Midwest ed.).
173. See, e.g., H.R. 4953, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See generally Plumb, What Ever
Happened to the A.B.A. Federal Tax Lien Legislation?, 18 Bus. LAw. 1103 (1963).
174. Cf. INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a).
175. If such legislation were enacted, the amount going to private entities would
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though it is to be hoped that Congress will completely abolish the
judicial doctrine of the inchoate lien, a minimum step would be the
prohibition of its use by private creditors seeking priority for their
portions of participation loans by assigning a debt to the SBA for
collection "in return" for a portion of the preferred recovery.
A further means of improving federal law would be a clarification
of the extent to which the SBA must respect state priority rules when
seeking collection through a contractual security interest created by
state law. As earlier suggested in this comment176 and as recently in•
timated by the Supreme Court,177 it seems most desirable to make
state law controlling. This could be accomplished without disrupting
general federal priority by prohibiting the SBA from invoking R.S.
§ 3466 and the inchoate lien doctrine to advance the priority of a
state-created contractual security interest. Finally, it would not seem
unreasonable to suggest that Congress extend the order of priorities
prescribed by section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act to nonbankruptcy
situations by amending R.S. § 3466.178 Extending the simple fairness
implicit in this ordered distribution would help to eliminate the
major inequities discussed above.
Ronald L. 0 lson
be increased by the amount claimed by the federal government on the portion of the
note owned by the leading bank but assigned to the SBA for collection, since the bank
would not assign its portion of the note unless the SBA promised to collect for the
bank.
176. See notes 121-24 supra and accompanying text.
177. See United States v. Yazell, 86 Sup. Ct. 500 (1966).
178. This proposal was embodied in H.R. 4953, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1963).
State and local taxes would be accorded equality with federal taxes, and all taxes would
have lower priority than administrative and funeral expenses and wage claims. United
States nontax claims would be given equal priority with rent claims, which follow
taxes in the order of priority.

